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TAXATION
OVERVIEW
There is an apparent trend within the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for safeguarding taxpayers' interests in tax litigation. The admin-
istrative and procedural cases analyzed in this article' have been
selected to illustrate how the circuit has made the government account
for its procedures in investigating and enforcing compliance with the
federal tax laws. Further, the scope of this article demonstrates that an
over-extension of the holdings in these cases could significantly limit the
government's capability to successfully prosecute future violations of
the federal tax laws.
In United States v. Phillips2 and United States v. Wells, 3 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted a subjective standard for assessing a taxpayer's "good faith
misunderstanding of law" defense for failure to file income tax returns
in violation of I.R.C. section 7203. 4 Such a subjective standard could
have wide-ranging ramifications on the government's efforts to effec-
tively deal with future tax protestor problems.
Two cases were decided during the survey period which applied the
"legitimate purpose" rule established in United States v. Powell 5 to assess
the appropriateness of the government's initiation of civil tax investiga-
tions. In United States v. Balanced Financial Management,6 the Tenth Cir-
cuit presented a thorough analysis of the proper standard by which the
initiation and implementation of civil tax investigations are judged in the
context of the Powell rule and subsequently enacted statutory and proce-
dural provisions. In United States v. Church of World Peace,7 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that certain statutory and constitutional safeguards served to
limit this "legitimate purpose" standard of Powell with respect to tax in-
vestigations of churches.
The Tenth Circuit, in Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 8 developed its
interpretation of the "reasonable diligence" standard to which the I.R.S.
1. This survey article discusses tax cases that were decided by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals between June, 1985 and May, 1986. Each of these cases involve statu-
tory provisions that are located in Subtitle F, Procedure and Administration, of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
2. 775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 12-53 and accompanying text.
3. 790 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
4. I.R.C. § 7203 (Supp. III 1985) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required
by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return,
keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such esti-
mated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such informa-
tion, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor....
5. 379 U.S. 48 (1964); see infra notes 54-91 and accompanying text.
6. 769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
7. 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
8. 769 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
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would be held in satisfying the statutory notice requirements for a valid
tax assessment under I.R.C. sections 62129 and 6213.10 Finally, in Voss
v. Bergsgaard, " I the Tenth Circuit provided its interpretation of the stan-
dard for particularity in a search warrant issued in connection with a
criminal tax investigation.
I. THE STANDARD FOR ASSESSING A GOOD FAITH MISUNDERSTANDING
OF LAw DEFENSE
A. Background
Because tax laws are highly complex and because Congress did not
intend to make criminals out of everyone who misunderstood them,
courts have frequently permitted a "good faith misunderstanding of
law" as a valid defense to negate the "willfulness" element in a prosecu-
tion for failure to file a tax return. 12 In United States v. Murdock,' 3 the
Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend that a person become
a criminal by reason of a bonafide misunderstanding of his liability for the
tax, of his duty to make a return, or of the adequacy of the records he
maintained, should he fail to measure up to a prescribed standard of
conduct.14 The Supreme Court explained in United States v. Bishop 15 that
wilfullness, in the context of tax litigation, is an "intentional violation of a
known legal duty."'
16
Based on the judicial interpretation of the applicable tax statutes,
courts have required that in order to prove willfulness in a tax case, the
government must show that the defendant intended to break the law.
17
While this rule was intended to prevent defendants from being con-
victed as criminals in the context of a complex tax issue, it has resulted
in an onerous burden on the government in tax protestor litigation.18
The question that has emerged in the prosecution of persons
charged with willful failure to file income tax returns in violation of
I.R.C. section 7203 is whether the proper standard for judging a mistake
of law is a subjective or an objectively reasonable one. The Supreme
9. I.R.C. § 6212(a)(1982) provides that the notice of deficiency must be sent by certi-
fied or registered mail to the taxpayer at his last known address.
10. I.R.C. § 6213(a)(1982) provides that any assessment imposed upon a taxpayer
without a notice of deficiency having been sent is void and illegal.
11. 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1985); see infra notes 106-132 and accompanying text.
12. It has long been recognized that ignorantia legis neminem excusat or "ignorance of the
law excuses no one." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 673 (5th ed. 1979). However, in the con-
text of tax litigation, courts have frequently been more permissive. See United States v.
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); see also United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976);
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
13. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
14. Id. at 396.
15. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
16. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
17. See cases cited supra note 12.
18. For a discussion of the problems inherent in the possible over-extension of the
rule that a "good faith misunderstanding of law" should be a valid defense in tax prosecu-
tions, see infra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
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Court's opinion in Spies v. United States 19 seems to imply some sort of
"reasonableness" standard: "It is not the purpose of the law to penalize
frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of
reasonable care."20 This was not an expressly stated standard, however,
and other circuits have reached inconsistent conclusions in applying a
standard.
2 1
B. Subjective Standard Employed in Assessing Wilfullness in Criminal Tax
Prosecutions Under I.R.C. Section 7203: United States v. Phillips
and United States v. Wells
1. United States v. Phillips
After trial to a jury, the defendant was convicted of willfully and
knowingly failing to file income tax returns for three years in violation of
I.R.C. section 7203. Thejury rejected the defendant's argument that his
failure to file was because he had sincerely and honestly believed that
wages were not income. The defendant appealed the conviction on the
ground that ajury instruction given at the trial2 2 significantly limited his
"good faith misunderstanding of law" defense. The jury instruction re-
quired an objectively reasonable belief rather than a subjective belief.
In reversing the conviction, the Tenth Circuit followed a First Cir-
cuit holding and applied a subjective standard. 23 The court chose to
reject the Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Moore,24 that a mis-
take of law must be objectively reasonable to be a valid defense. After
distinguishing Moore because the issue in that case involved the alleged
unconstitutionality of the tax law, the Tenth Circuit held that ". . . to the
extent Moore can be read as requiring that a good faith misunderstand-
ing of the tax laws be objectively reasonable, we decline to follow it."12 5
It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit distinguished between misun-
derstandings and disagreements and, in dicta, implied that good faith
disagreements with the tax laws or good faith beliefs that the laws are
19. 317 U.S. 492 (1983).
20. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
21. Compare United States v. Witvoet, 767 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Barney, 674 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1139 (1982); United States v. Moore,
627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981) (objectively reasonable stan-
dard) with United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Burton,
737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970) (subjective standard).
22. The good faith instruction given at trial was:
A mistake of law must be objectively reasonable to be a defense. If you find
that the defendant did not have a reasonable ground for his belief, then regard-
less of the defendant's sincerity of belief, you may find that he did not have a
good faith misunderstanding of the requirements of the law.
United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1985).
23. United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985). Defendant Phillips argued
for the application of the purely subjective standard that was adopted by the First Circuit
in Aitken, which was decided after Defendant Phillips was convicted, but before the filing of
Phillips' appeal.
24. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
25. Phillips, 775 F.2d at 264.
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unconstitutional would not be valid defenses in any case. 2 6
2. United States v. Wells
The Wells case involved substantially similar facts as those involved
in Phillips.2 7 The defendant in Wells was convicted by a jury of willfully
and knowingly failing to file income tax returns for four years in viola-
tion of I.R.C. section 7203. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that
his failure to file was the result of a mistaken interpretation of the tax
laws. Following its earlier holding in Phillips, the Tenth Circuit reversed
the conviction and remanded for a new trial based on its finding that the
jury instruction was erroneous.
3. Analysis
a. Split Among and Within Circuits
By adopting the standard used by the First Circuit in Aitken, the
Tenth Circuit may have created a stumbling block for successful prose-
cution of tax protestors. After Phillips and Wells, a defendant must only
show that he honestly holds a subjective belief, regardless of how outra-
geous, to negate the willfulness requirement of section 7203. This
purely subjective standard is contrary to previously established tax law
which provided that certain subjective beliefs would never be permitted
as valid defenses. These defenses include beliefs that the tax laws are
unconstitutional 28 and personal disagreements with the tax laws. 2 9 Not
only does the Phillips panel ignore the merits of the Seventh Circuit's
Moore decision, but it also appears to deviate from the position previ-
ously taken by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jensen,30 United States v.
26. Id.
27. The Wells case involved a "good faith misunderstanding of law" defense, similar
to the Phillips case. However, unlike Defendant Phillips, Defendant Wells did not testify at
his own trial to explain the nature of his beliefs, but rather chose to rely on the contents of
his previous written replies to the I.R.S. correspondence to explain the nature of his be-
liefs. The beliefs listed in the letters submitted into evidence at Wells' trial included the
belief that the defendant's wages were not "income," but rather were merely payments
received in exchange for his time and labor that resulted in no taxable gain or loss, and the
belief that the defendant was not a "taxpayer" as that word is used in the Internal Revenue
Code.
28. United States v. Jones, 628 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967
(1981); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1012 (1980); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 405 (10th Cir. 1979).
29. United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kar-
sky, 610 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980). In addition to
beliefs that the tax laws are unconstitutional and other disagreements, there are several
exceptions which prevail in some jurisdictions which adhere to the subjective standard,
including beliefs that the requirement of filing a tax return violates the taxpayer's fifth
amendment rights (United States v. Jensen, No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983)); that
one is not a "person" as defined in the tax laws (United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014
(9th Cir. 1981)); and that insufficient funds justifies failure to file (Yarborough v. United
States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956)). None of these beliefs are
recognized as valid good faith beliefs sufficient to constitute an affirmative defense to ne-
gate the "willfulness" that is required as a requisite to the crime.
30. No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983).
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Wainwright,3 1 and United States v. Ware32 which was to require some de-
gree of reasonableness before a particular belief was accepted as a valid
defense.
i. Appropriateness of Subjective Standard: United States v. Aitken
In the First Circuit case of United States v. Aitken, 3 3 the defendant was
convicted in the district court for willfully failing to file tax returns in
violation of I.R.C. section 7203, and for willfully filing false withholding
exemption certificates in violation of I.R.C. section 7205. 3 4 The convic-
tions were vacated on appeal and the case was remanded to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with the First Circuit's ruling
that "willfulness" in a criminal tax prosecution under I.R.C. sections
7203 and 7205 is measured by a subjective standard. In reaching its
decision, the Aitken court relied upon several Supreme Court opinions
which it interpreted as standing for the proposition that a subjective
standard was the appropriate measure for assessing a good faith be-
lief.35 The inherent fallacy in this purely subjective standard is that it
fails to recognize any objective constraints. Such a standard is contrary
to pre-existing tax law which provides that certain subjective beliefs
would never be valid defenses.
3 6
ii. The Objectively Reasonable Standard: United States v. Moore
In United States v. Moore,3 7 the defendant was convicted for willfully
failing to file tax returns. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the
defendant's contention that the jury instructions did not adequately in-
form the jury of his "good faith" defense. The court concluded that
when the district court gives a correct definition of "willfully" to the
jury, no additional "good faith" defense instruction is required.3 8 More
significantly, the court stated that "the mistake must be objectively
reasonable.''39
31. 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
32. 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
33. 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985).
34. I.R.C. § 7205(a) (Supp. III 1985) provides in pertinent part:
Any individual required to supply information to his employer .. .who willfully
supplies false or fraudulent information, or who willfully fails to supply informa-
tion .. .shall, in addition to any other penalty provided by law, upon conviction
thereof, be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both.
35. See cases cited supra note 12.
36. See supra notes 28 and 29.
37. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
38. Id. at 833; see also United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11 (1976) ("willful act"
defined as "one done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do some-
thing which the law forbids, that is to say with [the] bad purpose to disobey or to disregard
the law"); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 405 (10th Cir. 1979) ("willfully" means a
"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty"); Yarborough v. United States,
230 F.2d 56, 61 (4th Cir.) ("willful" defined as "voluntary, purposeful, deliberate and in-
tentional"), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956).
39. Moore, 627 F.2d at 833 (citing United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 948 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir. 1978); Kratz v.
Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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In Phillips, the Tenth Circuit downplays the significance of the Moore
opinion by incorrectly claiming that the objectively reasonable standard
was discussed in dicta, and by claiming that the Seventh Circuit ap-
peared to have vascillated between an objective and subjective stan-
dard.40 This is not, however, an accurate depiction of the state of affairs
in the Seventh Circuit. The "objectively reasonable" language in Moore
was expressly reaffirmed by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Anton 4 1
and in United States v. Witvoet.
4 2
The Seventh Circuit's subsequent affirmations of its holding in
Moore plainly indicate that the primary holding of the Moore decision is
that an objectively reasonable standard is the appropriate measure to
assess a good faith belief, and that such a holding is an "accurate expres-
sion of the law in the Seventh Circuit." 4 3 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's at-
tempt in Phillips to minimize the significance of the Moore standard and
to deny that there is a split among the circuits is disingenuous.
b. Subjective Beliefs Which Are Never Considered
to be Valid Defenses
Although Phillips holds that a subjective standard is the appropriate
measure to assess a good faith belief, there are some recognized excep-
tions which would not be valid defenses in any case. Defendants who
honestly believe that the income tax laws are unconstitutional are not
afforded a defense for their mistaken belief.4 4 Similarly, a good faith
disagreement with the tax laws is not a valid defense no matter how sin-
cerely the disagreement is felt.4 5 The Tenth Circuit has expressly rec-
ognized these exceptions to a subjective standard.4 6 As stated in
Phillips: "we decline to impose criminal liability on individuals who in
good faith misunderstand the law. These individuals are, of course, to
be distinguished from those who understand the obligations imposed
upon them by the tax law but disagree with that law or view it as unconstitu-
tional."'4 7 In light of these exceptions to a subjective standard, a purely
subjective standard is an impossible measure to assess a "good faith mis-
understanding of law" defense.
A possible resolution to this dilemma would be to recognize an ad-
ditional exception. Some degree of reasonableness should be required
of a belief before a "good faith misunderstanding of law" defense is per-
mitted to negate a claim of willfulness. This proposed resolution is not
a novel position. As suggested by the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
40. United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1985).
41. 683 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1982).
42. 767 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir. 1985). Witvoet was decided after the First Circuit deci-
sion in Aitken.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 28.
45. See supra note 29.
46. United States v. Jensen, No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983); United States v.
Weninger, 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v.
Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
47. United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
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Ware,4 8 if a belief is so "devoid of reason and logic" that no one could
possibly have believed it, then the "good faith" defense should not be
permitted.
4 9
Similarly, in United States v. Jensen,5 0 the Tenth Circuit rejected as
meritless the defendant's purported good faith assertion of his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Tenth Circuit
stated that to accept such a belief as a valid defense against a claim of
willfulness would be to permit a "good faith" defense to anyone who
had some notion of how the fifth amendment privilege worked, no mat-
ter how outlandish the notion.5 1 In assessing the taxpayer's beliefs, the
Jensen court refused to accept the taxpayer's outlandish interpretation of
the fifth amendment as a valid "good faith" defense.
52
Clearly, the court's adoption of a subjective standard in Phillips and
Wells is out of step with prior Tenth Circuit decisions. The adoption of
such a standard could lead to further inconsistencies within the Tenth
Circuit as future cases are decided.
53
4. Implications of Holdings
The imposition of a purely subjective standard to assess a "good
faith misunderstanding of law" defense may further limit the govern-
ment's capability to effectively control tax protestors' defiance of tax
laws. Because there appears to be a split among the circuits and incon-
sistent holdings within the Tenth Circuit, guidance from the Supreme
Court may be necessary. In the alternative, reconsideration by the
Tenth Circuit, or at the very least, extreme care in the application of this
liberal, subjective standard, seems appropriate.
II. THE STANDARD BY WHICH CIVIL TAX INVESTIGATIONS ARE
INITIATED AND IMPLEMENTED
A. Background
In the landmark Supreme Court case of United States v. Powell,5 4 it
was established that to initiate a civil tax investigation, the investigation
48. 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
49. Id. at 405-06. Furthermore, the court stated: "The defendant contends that his
personal belief in what the law is, or should be, supersedes the federal Constitution and
statutes as construed and applied by the Supreme Court. If each citizen is a law unto
himself, government will exist in name only."
50. No. 82-1648 (10th Cir. May 11, 1983).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. Both defendants in Phillips and Wells were re-convicted on remand by juries that
were given revised jury instructions. However, the burden placed on the government by
the imposition of a purely subjective standard to assess a "good faith misunderstanding of
law" defense could likely deter future prosecution of tax protestors by the government.
The fact that the jurors on the remand of Phillips and Wells were unconvinced that the
respective defendants held a sincere and honest mistaken belief of law, cannot be under-
stood to mean that future jurors who are presented with similar evidence will be likewise
unconvinced. The government will have to be prepared to satisfy this heavy burden and
therefore may become reluctant to prosecute tax protestors.
54. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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must have a legitimate purpose, the inquiry must be relevant to the pur-
pose, the information sought must not already be within the Commis-
sioner's possession, and the administrative steps required by the Code
must have been followed." '5 5 The Tenth Circuit presented a thorough
analysis of the Powell "legitimate purpose" standard in United States v.
Balanced Financial Management 56 in the context of subsequently enacted
statutory and procedural provisions.
57
The "legitimate purpose" standard, as restated in Balanced Financial
Management, was subsequently limited with respect to civil tax investiga-
tions of churches in United States v. Church of World Peace.5 8 The reason-
ing for this limitation stemmed from the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
and application of certain statutory and constitutional safeguards.
59
In Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley,60 the Tenth Circuit developed its
interpretation of the "reasonable diligence" standard that governs the
I.R.S. in satisfying the statutory notice requirements for a valid tax
assessment.
B. Powell Standard Upheld and Analyzed in Light of New Statutory and
Procedural Provisions: United States v. Balanced Financial
Management
1. Case in Context
This case provides a useful overview of the standards by which the
initiation and implementation of civil tax investigations by the govern-
ment are judged. Although the government's investigation procedures
were found to be proper, the review of the government's compliance
with prescribed standards of conduct is indicative of the court's concern
for taxpayers' interests.
2. Statement of Case
Balanced Financial Management ("BFM") was an Arizona corpora-
tion with a principal office in Salt Lake City, Utah, and several offices in
Colorado. BFM promoted investments in property owned byJarelco, a
Texas corporation which owned master audio tape recordings of chil-
55. Id. at 57-58.
56. 769 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
57. I.R.C. §§ 7401, 7402, and 7604 (1982) (these sections authorize the commence-
ment of a civil action for recovery of taxes and grant jurisdiction to federal district courts
to enforce I.R.S. summons); Rev. Proc. 83-78, 1983-2 C.B. 596. Rev. Proc. 83-78 has been
modified and is effective as modified for returns, claims or applications filed after Decem-
ber 10, 1984. Rev. Proc. 84-84, 1984-1 C.B. 307. For an explanation of Rev. Proc. 83-78,
see infra note 61.
58. 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985).
59. These safeguards include I.R.C. § 7605(c) (1982) and first amendment freedom of
religion and freedom of association rights. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Section 7605(c) has
been changed substantially by I.R.C. § 7611 (Supp. III 1985). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the appeal in Church of World Peace arose under I.R.C. § 7605. For the language
of § 7605(c), see infra note 79.
60. 769 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1985).
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dren's music and related original artwork. Jarelco marketed leases of
interests in the master recordings and represented to investors that they
would be able to claim investment tax credit pass-throughs which were
based on appraised values. The government subsequently alleged that
the appraised values were grossly inflated. The I.R.S. issued an adminis-
trative summons to BFM directing its officers to appear to testify and to
produce for examination specified records relating to the period ex-
tending from January 1, 1981 through January 6, 1984.61 The records
requested included BFM's books and financial records, essentially all of
BFM's records relating to its business transactions with Jarelco and sev-
eral other named persons, and all of its records relating to the promo-
tion of tax shelters. BFM did not respond to the summons.
The government filed a petition in district court to enforce the sum-
mons. The court found that because the government's actions were not
improper, BFM was required to comply with the summons. Subse-
quently, BFM filed a motion to enjoin further government investigation,
which was denied by the court. The government filed a petition for an
order to show cause why BFM should not be held in contempt for failing
to comply with the summons. The court eventually dismissed the gov-
ernment's petition for failure to prosecute. Both sides appealed.
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Enforcement of Administrative Summons and Denial of BFM's
Request to Enjoin Further Government Investigation
BFM appealed the district court's order enforcing an I.R.S. sum-
mons and denying BFM's request to enjoin further government investi-
gation. The I.R.S. contended that it was conducting an investigation to
determine whether BFM was liable for any internal revenue tax or penal-
ties for promoting abusive tax shelters, 62 or had committed any offense
under the internal revenue laws. BFM argued that the summons issued
by the district court was issued for an illegitimate purpose, in violation
of the Powell standard. BFM contended that this illegitimate purpose
61. The summons related to an examination being conducted pursuant to Rev. Proc.
83-78 which, in addition to the penalty and injunction provisions, could have resulted in
the issuance of notices to BFM's clients and potential clients who were identified through
the use of the summons.
Revenue Procedure 83-78 describes the program implemented by the Internal Reve-
nue Service to identify and investigate abusive tax shelter promotions. The purpose of
this revenue procedure was to discuss the procedures to be followed in identifying and
investigating abusive tax shelters and to describe the options available to the Service once
an abusive tax shelter has been identified and investigated. These options include a re-
quest for injunctive relief under section 7408 of the Internal Revenue Code, assertion of
penalties under section 6700, and issuance of pre-filing notifications to investors.
62. Penalty provisions for promoting abusive tax shelters are found in I.R.C. § 6700
(1982). I.R.C. § 6700 was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and was subsequently amended by the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6700
(1984)). The provision provided for penalties against persons who promote abusive tax
shelters, and granted the I.R.S. the authority to obtain an injunction against such
promotors to enjoin them from further promotion.
1987]
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was evidenced by the fact that the I.R.S. was conducting simultaneous,
multi-district, duplicate examinations which amounted to harassment of
BFM, and that the I.R.S. was making unauthorized disclosures to the
public concerning the existence and status of tax examinations against
BFM for the purpose of ruining its business in Colorado.
63
The Tenth Circuit determined that the standard set forth in Powell
applied to the statutes and that the government had satisfied this stan-
dard by establishing in its affidavit that the investigation had been con-
ducted pursuant to a "legitimate purpose." 64  The Tenth Circuit
affirmed both the district court's denial of BFM's request for an injunc-
tion and its issuance of the order enforcing the summons. This decision
was based on the Tenth Circuit's finding that BFM had failed to meet its
burden of refuting the government's prima facie showing for enforce-
ment of the summons. 65 Furthermore, the court rejected BFM's conten-
tion that Revenue Procedure 83-78 was being administered in a
harassing manner, holding that the Procedure does not require centrali-
zation of an investigation of a tax shelter promotion which operates in
several districts.
66
b. Denial of Motion for Limited Discovery Privileges
BFM sought limited discovery privileges and an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the I.R.S. had an illegitimate purpose behind the
summons. Relying on prior Tenth Circuit decisions,6 7 the court held
that discovery is available in summons enforcement proceedings only in
extraordinary situations. Since BFM failed to make a substantial prelim-
inary showing that the I.R.S. did not issue the summons in good faith,
BFM's discovery motion was denied.
c. Requirement for John Doe Summons, Pursuant to L R.C. Section
7609(f), Not Applicable
I.R.C. section 7609(f) includes a "John Doe" provision which re-
quires judicial approval before the I.R.S. can serve a summons seeking
information from unnamed taxpayers. 68 The Tenth Circuit held that
the I.R.S. need not comply with these requirements when it serves a
63. BFM, 769 F.2d at 1445.
64. Id. at 1443.
65. Id. at 1444.
66. Id. at 1446.
67. United States v. Security Bank and Trust Co., 661 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
68. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1982) provides:
Additional requirement in the case of a John Doe summons. Any summons de-
scribed in subsection (c) which does not identify the person with respect to whose
liability the summons is issued may be served only after a court proceeding in
which the Secretary establishes that-
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertain-
able group or class of persons,
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class of
persons may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of any internal
revenue law, and
(3) the information sought to be obtained from the examination of the records
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summons on a known taxpayer for the dual purpose of investigating
both the tax liability of that taxpayer and the tax liabilities of unnamed
parties, as long as all of the information sought is relevant to a legiti-
mate investigation of the summoned taxpayer. 6 9
d. Allegation of L R. S Waiver of Right to Compel Compliance With
Summons Reected
BFM contended that the I.R.S. waived its right to compel compli-
ance with the summons when a revenue agent "agreed" that BFM would
not be required to comply with the summons until it had received a writ-
ten response to its letter to the Regional Commissioner requesting cen-
tralization of the I.R.S. investigation. In his declaration under penalty of
perjury, the revenue agent stated that he had never agreed to "suspend,
waive, or postpone [BFM's] appearance pursuant to the summons in is-
sue," but merely stated that he "understood [BFM's] position."'70
Since the question of an "agreement" between BFM and the I.R.S.
was not before the court on appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not address
the question of whether there was an "agreement" and whether such
"agreement" would have constituted a waiver. However, the court held
that even assuming the I.R.S. had agreed to change the original compli-
ance date, it had effectively responded to BFM's request by letter advis-
ing BFM that a sufficient basis existed for each district to proceed with
its respective investigation. The court thus rejected BFM's contention
that the I.R.S. had waived its right to compel compliance with the
summons.
4. Implications of Holding
This decision represents a thorough restatement of the current
standards to which the I.R.S. is held in initiating and implementing civil
tax investigations. These standards are premised on the long-estab-
lished judicial precedent set forth in Powell and applied in the context of
subsequently enacted statutory and procedural provisions. Although
the court resolved the issues in favor of the government in this case, its
thorough review of the government's compliance with such standards is
indicative of an apparent trend by the circuit to require strict adherence
by the government to a high standard of care in conducting tax
investigations.
(and the identity of the person or persons with respect to whose liability the sum-
mons is issued) is not readily available from other sources.
69. BFM, 769 F.2d at 1448-49 (citing Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S.
310 (1985)).
70. Id. at 1449 n.9.
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C. Limitations of the Powell Standard for Investigations of Churches Under
I. R.C. Section 7605(c) and its Successor, Section 7611: United
States v. Church of World Peace
1. Case in Context
Although the standard of care applied in the initiation and imple-
mentation of general tax investigations had been clearly established in
Powell, the question before the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Church of
World Peace71 was whether an administrative summons issued by the
I.R.S. should be examined under a more restrictive standard when the
investigation involves a church.
Statutory provisions such as I.R.C. section 7605(c) 72 reflect a con-
gressionally-determined balance between the government's legitimate
interest in tax records and the rights of church organizations under the
first amendment. The issue addressed by the Church of World Peace court,
however, was whether the Powell "legitimate purpose" standard was ap-
plicable or whether some measure of necessity was imposed by section
7605(c). 73 While the Tenth Circuit had not previously addressed the
issue, courts which have addressed it are not in agreement.7 4 After care-
ful consideration and analysis, the Tenth Circuit required the govern-
ment to exercise greater care in the case of church investigations. The
government was required to satisfy the "extent necessary" language of
section 7605(c). 75 Since this was not accomplished, the district court's
71. 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985).
72. Subsection (c) of Section 7605 of the Internal Revenue Code was added by Sec-
tion 121( ) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 548 (1969) (codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 7605(c) (1969)). Section 7605(c), the section under which the appeal in
this case arose, provides:
Restriction on examination of churches.
No examination of the books of account of a church or convention or association
of churches shall be made to determine whether such organization may be en-
gaged in the carrying on of an unrelated trade or business or may be otherwise
engaged in activities which may be subject to tax under part III of subchapter F of
chapter 1 of this title (section 511 and following, relating to taxation of business
income of exempt organizations) unless the Secretary or his delegate (such officer
being no lower than a principal internal revenue officer for an internal revenue
region) believes that such organization may be so engaged and so notifies the
organization in advance of the examination. No examination of the religious ac-
tivities of such an organization shall be made except to the extent necessary to deter-
mine whether such organization is a church or a convention or association of
churches, and no examination of the books of account of such an organization
shall be made other than to the extent necessary to determine the amount of tax
imposed by this title. (emphasis added).
73. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d at 267.
74. See generally United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1982) (statute permits
examinations necessary to determine tax liability under any I.R.C. provision); United
States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981), (District court's application of a "truly
necessary" standard in error) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982); United States v. Life Science
Church, 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd after remand sub nom. United States v. Norcutt,
680 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1982) (I.R.S. summons overly broad); United States v. Holmes, 614
F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (summons of impermissible scope); United States v. Freedom
Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979) (refusing to restrict I.R.S. inquiry).
75. United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265, 268 (10th Cir. 1985).
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order enforcing the I.R.S. administrative summons was set aside. 76
The Tenth Circuit's ruling that the purpose of section 7605(c) was
to place limits on the examination of churches or inquiries by the I.R.S.
is consistent with the trend to safeguard the taxpayer's interests and to
hold the government accountable to a high standard of care in its inves-
tigative efforts. The concern raised by such a decision is whether this
holding might limit the government's ability to control the tax abuse of
fraudulent religious groups.
2. Statement of Case
Church of World Peace involved a district court order enforcing an ad-
ministrative summons issued by the I.R.S. The summons requested cer-
tain books and records 7 7 of the Church of World Peace as well as the
testimony of its pastor, Reverend William Conklin.
After determining that the summoned data might be relevant to de-
termine the tax exempt status of the church and its possible tax liability,
the district court issued an order enforcing the summons. This holding
was based on the view that the public interest in making such determina-
tions outweighed the church's privacy interests.
78
The church appealed on the ground that the district court erred in
holding that the summons was enforceable because it satisfied the Powell
standard. 7 9 The church contended that I.R.C. section 7605(c) placed
limitations on the Powell standard for investigation of churches, main-
taining that the enforcement order should be reversed due to the gov-
ernment's failure to meet this higher statutory standard. 80 Further, the
church argued that the district court erred in its determination that the
summons was not overbroad.
8 1
The government responded that an examination of books and
records for the purpose of reviewing whether a church qualifies for tax
exempt status does not result in "excessive entanglement" or violate
rights of freedom of religion and association. 8 2 Further, the govern-
ment argued that it had satisfied the "extent necessary," "notice," and
"belief" requirements provided in the relevant Treasury Regulations 8 3
76. Id.
77. According to the district court's record, the summons requested, among other
items, all books, records, and papers of the Church of World Peace and all records relating
to any and all assets owned or used by the Church of World Peace and the manner in
which such assets were acquired. Records regarding the nature and specific extent of all
religious activities conducted by the Church were also requested. Record on Appeal,
United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1985)(No. 84-2200).
78. United States v. Church of World Peace, No. 84-X-236, slip op. at 2 (D. Colo.
Aug. 30, 1984).
79. Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1985)(84-2200).
80. Id. at 10-11.
81. Id. at 12-13.
82. United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Christian Ech-
oes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
83. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7605-1(c)(2) (1985) provides:
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by sending a letter from the Regional Commissioner to the church, stat-
ing that it was necessary to examine its books and records. 84 The final
argument raised by the government was that section 7605 placed no re-
strictions on the examination of churches because the government's
duty to determine the proper taxes due overrides any statutory
restrictions.
85
The Tenth Circuit set aside the enforcement order, finding that
I.R.C. section 7605(c) and first amendment safeguards prevented the
application of the Powell standard in examinations of churches. The gov-
ernment, according to the Tenth Circuit, failed to meet this higher stan-
dard. 8 6 Citing In re First National Bank, Englewood, Colorado,8 7 the court
found that the church's affidavits were sufficient to shift the burden of
proof to the government to justify its request to identify the members of
the church, and that the government failed to meet its burden. The
court also rejected the government's claim that section 7605 placed no
restrictions on the examination of churches because such a proposition
would nullify the effect of the statute and render it without a purpose.
8 8
The court relied on the Eighth Circuit decision in United States v. Life
Science Church ,89 and the Fifth Circuit ruling in United States v. Holmes90 in
reaching its conclusion that the all-inclusive language in the summons
was overly broad under section 7605(c). In support of its conclusion,
the court quoted the Fifth Circuit decision in Holmes:
Restriction on examination of churches-
Books of account. No examination of the books of account of an organization which
claims to be a church or a convention or association of churches shall be made
except after the giving of notice as provided in this subparagraph and except to
the extent necessary (i) to determine the initial or continuing qualification of the
organizations under section 501 (c)(3); (ii) to determine whether the organization
qualifies as one, contributions to which are deductible under sections 170, 545,
556, 642, 2055, 2106, or 2522; (iii) to obtain information for the purpose of as-
certaining or verifying payments made by the organization to another person in
determining the tax liability of the recipient, such as payments of salaries, wages,
or other forms of compensation; or (iv) to determine the amount of tax, if any,
imposed by the Code upon such organization. No examination of the books of
account of a church or convention or association of churches shall be made unless
the Regional Commissioner believes that such examination is necessary and so notifies the or-
ganization in writing at least 30 days in advance of examination. The Regional
Commissioner will conclude that such examination is necessary only after reason-
able attempts have been made to obtain information from the books of account
by written request and the Regional Commissioner has determined that the infor-
mation cannot be fully or satisfactorily obtained in that manner. In any examina-
tion of a church or convention or association of churches for the purpose of
determining unrelated business income tax liability pursuant to such notice, no
examination of the books of account of the organization shall be made except to
the extent necessary to determine such liability. (emphasis added).
84. Record on Appeal at 12-13, United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1985)(No. 84-2200).
85. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d at 268 (citing United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629
(9th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 983 (1982)).
86. Id.
87. 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983).
88. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d at 268.
89. 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980).
90. 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The second prong of the Powell test was pruned back by Con-
gress in 1969, in regard to examination of churches, when it
added subsection (c) to 26 U.S.C. § 7605. That provision limits
the inquiry into the religious activities and books of account of
churches "to the extent necessary" to ensure that the organiza-
tion is a church and to determine the amount of tax owing.
The "extent necessary" syntax is certainly more restrictive than
the "may be relevant" language in the second tier of Powell.9 1
3. Implications of Holding
The Church of World Peace decision is consistent with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's attempt to require the government to strictly adhere to a high
standard of care in conducting tax investigations, especially those in-
volving first amendment considerations. However, limiting examina-
tions of churches in this fashion could possibly hamper the
government's ability to control the tax abuse of fraudulent religious
groups.
D. Notice Requirements for Valid Tax Assessments Pursuant to I. R. C. Sections
6212 and 6213: Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley
1. Case in Context
I.R.C. section 621392 provides that any tax assessment imposed
upon a taxpayer without proper notice is void and illegal. I.R.C. section
621293 provides that a Notice of Deficiency must be sent by certified or
registered mail to the taxpayer at his "last known address." Generally,
the I.R.S. is required to use "reasonable diligence" in attempting to de-
termine the taxpayer's correct address. 94 The issue addressed by the
Tenth Circuit in Cyclone Drilling was the extent to which the taxpayer
could explore the "reasonable diligence" that the I.R.S. exercised in as-
certaining the taxpayer's "last known address."
2. Statement of Case
The taxpayer sought an injunction barring the I.R.S. from collect-
ing an assessment of tax deficiencies for the 1979 and 1980 tax years
which the taxpayer claimed were void due to improper notice. The issue
91. Id. at 988 (footnote omitted).
92. See supra note 10.
93. See supra note 9.
94. Cool Fuel Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 313 (9th Cir. 1982) (duty of I.R.S. to
exercise reasonable diligence not complied with where it was put on notice that taxpayer
had moved when notice of deficiency was returned as undeliverable); Mall v. Kelly, 564 F.
Supp. 371, 373 (D. Wyo. 1983) (reasonable diligence in locating taxpayer is satisfied by
following published I.R.S. procedures on obtaining taxpayer's last known address); Tan-
gren v. Mihlbachler, 522 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Colo. 1981) (I.R.S. failed to exercise rea-
sonable diligence in determining taxpayer's new address before it attempted to seize
taxpayer's property to satisfy alleged tax deficiency); Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 367, 374 (1974), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976) (reasonable dili-
gence in determining taxpayer's correct address satisfied when Commissioner used the
address appearing on taxpayer's return as the last known in the absence of clear and con-
cise notification from the taxpayer directing the Commissioner to use a different address).
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before the district court was whether the I.R.S. had sent the Notice of
Deficiency to the taxpayer's "last known address." The court found that
there was no material issue of fact and that the I.R.S. had properly sent
the notice. Accordingly, the district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment and denied the taxpayer's requests for
discovery and for an injunction to enjoin the I.R.S. from collecting the
tax. The issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in its de-
termination that no issue of material fact existed.
Since the taxpayer used its new post office box address on its Appli-
cation for Additional Time to File Corporation Income Tax Return and
on its actual 1980 return, and because the I.R.S. had used the taxpayer's
new post office box address approximately fifteen times in correspon-
dence concerning unrelated employment tax matters, the Tenth Circuit
held that an issue of material fact remained as to what was the I.R.S.'
actual knowledge of the taxpayer's "last known address."'9 5 Further, the
court held that by denying the taxpayer's discovery requests, the tax-
payer was unable to review the government's compliance with the "rea-
sonable diligence" standard and its own internal procedures.9 6 The
court concluded that the taxpayer did not have a full and fair opportu-
nity to explore whether the I.R.S. had, in fact, exercised "reasonable
diligence" in determining the taxpayer's "last known address".9 7 Ac-
cordingly, the case was reversed and remanded for a complete consider-
ation of all pertinent facts and reasonable inferences.
3. Analysis
An analysis of this decision begins with the definition of "last known
address." In the absence of a statutory definition, courts have inter-
preted it to mean "that address to which the I.R.S. reasonably believes
the taxpayer wishes the notice sent." 9 8 Generally, when a taxpayer
changes his address, he is required to give the I.R.S. notice of the
change.9 9 In deciding what constitutes adequate notice, the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, 10 0 holding that the filing
of a tax return for a year subsequent to the year at issue and bearing a
new address is "clear and concise" notice to the I.R.S. 10 Accordingly,
the address on the taxpayer's most recent return will ordinarily be the
taxpayer's "last known address."
10 2
95. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 665 (10th Cir. 1985).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 665 (citing Cool Fuel Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d. 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982)).
98. Id. at 664 (citing United States v. Ahrens, 530 F.2d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1976) and
Sorrentino v. Ross, 425 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1970) and Delman v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 384 F.2d 929, 932 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968)).
99. Weinroth v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 430, 435 (1980).
100. United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 169 U.S. 830
(1984); Cool Fuel v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982); McPartlin v. Commis-
sioner, 653 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Ninth Circuit cases).
101. Cyclone Drilling, Inc. v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1985).
102. See DeWelles v. United States, 378 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986
(1967); Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962).
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The relevant inquiry focuses on the government's knowledge,
rather than on the taxpayer's actual current address.10 3 In addition, the
I.R.S. is required to use "reasonable diligence" in attempting to deter-
mine the taxpayer's correct address.'
0 4
4. Implications of Holding
The Tenth Circuit's ruling that the taxpayer is entitled to know
more about how its own case was handled is indicative of the court's
concern for the taxpayer's interests. It could be expected that the "com-
plete consideration" on remand of the case would include a review of
the methods used by the I.R.S. in ascertaining the taxpayer's "last
known address" and a review of any pertinent I.R.S. procedural manu-
als.' 0 5 Accordingly, the I.R.S. will have the burden of proof to show
compliance with its own internal procedures.
The court's decision to hold the I.R.S. strictly accountable to a "rea-
sonable diligence" standard, the shift in the burden of proof, and the
increased public scrutiny to which the I.R.S. is being subjected are addi-
tional examples of an apparent trend within the Tenth Circuit to protect
the taxpayers' interests at the risk of limiting the government's abilities
to enforce compliance with the internal revenue laws.
III. THE STANDARD FOR PARTICULARITY IN SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUED
IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
A. Background
The fourth amendment provides that persons have a right to be
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment. 10 6 Generally, this right has been construed to prevent the issu-
ance of general search warrants by imposing certain requirements on
their issuance. For a search warrant to issue, there must be a showing
supported by a written affidavit of probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed, that the items sought are evidence of such crime,
and that such evidence will be at the place sought to be searched. 10 7
The fourth amendment's particularity requirement provides that the af-
fidavit must describe in detail the items sought so that "nothing is left to
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."' 0 8 The particularity
requirement may cause significant problems in the case of tax investiga-
103. Cyclone Drilling, 769 F.2d at 664 (citing Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62
T.C. 367, 374 (1974), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
107. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 558-59 (1978).
108. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
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tions involving the seizure of business records and documents because
the items sought must be specifically described.
The particularity requirement is generally less stringent when ap-
plied to the search of business enterprises that are considered to be per-
vasive schemes to defraud or are inherently criminal. 10 9 Cases in
support of this notion hold that if an entire business enterprise is per-
meated with criminal activity and the government sufficiently supports
its probable cause determination, a warrant seeking all business records
is not overbroad.I l0
B. Limitations Placed on Scope of Search Warrant Issued for Premises of an
Enterprise Alleged by the I.R.S. to be a Pervasive Tax Fraud Scheme:
Voss v. Bergsgaard
1. Case in Context
Voss v. Bergsgaard III involved a review of the particularity require-
ment as it relates to a criminal tax investigation of an enterprise that
allegedly promotes fraudulent tax shelters in violation of I.R.C. section
6700.112 According to the Tenth Circuit, the sufficiency of the govern-
ment's showing that the taxpayer's activities are inherently criminal and
the protection of certain first amendment freedoms are factors which
affect the particularity requirement. The court also addressed whether
the warrant was at least partially in compliance with the particularity
standard, which would justify severance and acceptance of the valid
portion.
The Tenth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's decision both
to invalidate the search warrant because it did not meet the particularity
standard and to grant the taxpayer's motion for the return of all prop-
erty seized is an example of the circuit's imposition of a high standard of
care on the government. The decision to uphold the taxpayer's interests
over the government's need for the information in connection with its
criminal tax investigation is consistent with an apparent trend by the
circuit to safeguard taxpayers' interests.
2. Statement of Case
This case reviewed the validity of search warrants issued upon ap-
plication by I.R.S. agents. Each application for a search warrant was
supported by an affidavit which outlined an extensive investigation of an
109. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (seizure of business records from of-
fice for evidence of fraudulent real estate scheme); see also United States v. Offices Known
as 50 State Distributing Co., 708 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021
(1984) (seizure of records justified where affidavit showed pervasively fraudulent opera-
tion encompassing entire business); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980) (seizure of business records justified by a finding of probable
cause that defendant was committing mail and wire fraud).
110. See supra note 109.
111. 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1985).
112. Seesupra note 62.
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alleged tax protestor group and contained a detailed description of the
items to be seized." 13 After the warrants were executed, the taxpayer
filed a Rule 41(e) motion1 1 4 seeking the return of all documents and
other evidence seized. The taxpayer alleged that the warrants were not
supported by sufficient probable cause and that they failed to describe
with sufficient particularity the property to be seized. The district court
ruled that although the affidavits set forth sufficient probable cause, they
were nevertheless invalid on particularity grounds.'15
The government appealed on the grounds that the district court
erred in finding that the search warrants did not meet the particularity
requirement and in granting the taxpayer's motion for the return of the
seized property. The government's alternative argument was that it
should have been allowed to retain the evidence seized under those pro-
visions of the warrant which were sufficiently particular.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the war-
rants were invalid on particularity grounds and that they amounted to
illegal writs of assistance since they gave the government "carte blanche
... to take anything that they saw, whether it was nailed down or other-
wise." 1 1 6 The court also rejected the government's request for sever-
ance of the warrant and retention of the evidence seized under
sufficiently particular provisions. The basis for this ruling was that most
of the warrant's provisions were overbroad and largely subsumed those
provisions that would have been adequate standing alone."1
7
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Fourth Amendment Considerations
The Tenth Circuit rejected the government's contention that the
search warrants did not amount to general warrants given the criminal
nature of the taxpayer's activities. The court held that the government
failed to show that the taxpayer's activities amounted to a pervasive
scheme to defraud, which could have supported the seizure of all busi-
ness records. The court did not agree with the government's reliance
on Andreson v. Maryland 18 as standing for the proposition that white
113. The items to be seized included substantially all of the taxpayer's business
records. Voss, 774 F.2d at 406 n.l.
114. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) provides as follows:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the prop-
erty on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which
was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact neces-
sary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall be
restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. If a
motion for return of property is made or comes on for hearing in the district for
trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion
to suppress under Rule 12.
115. Voss, 774 F.2d at 403.
116. Id. at 404 (quoting Record at 68, Voss (Nos. 85-447M, 85-448M, 85-450M)).
117. Id. at 406.
118. 427 U.S. 463, 480-81 n.10 (1976).
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collar criminals should not find refuge behind the particularity require-
ments simply because the extent and the complexity of their activities
make impossible a more precise definition of the evidence sought. Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected the government's claim that under the cir-
cumstances the description of the items to be seized was as specific as
could be expected.
b. First Amendment Considerations
The Tenth Circuit did not accept the government's contention that
first amendment free speech and free association considerations do not
impose a higher standard of "scrupulous exactitude" 1 9 when items
seized have evidentiary value independent of any protected speech they
might contain or associations they might identify. 12 0 The court did not
find any merit to the argument that first amendment rights are not in-
fringed, and the "scrupulous exactitude" test of Stanford v. Texas 12' does
not apply when the basis for the seizure of written material is not for the
ideas they contain. 122 The court also rejected the argument that the
government's interest in securing compliance with its internal revenue
laws overrides any incidental infringement of first amendment associa-
tion rights. 1
23
The Tenth Circuit also discounted the argument that the public
should not be permitted to shield criminal conduct from government
investigation via first amendment freedom of association protection.
12 4
The court rejected the government's contention that the first amend-
ment safeguards that the Tenth Circuit sought to uphold in its 1983
decision of In re First National Bank of Englewood, Colorado 125 would not be
eliminated when, as in this case, the government has made an abundant
showing of probable cause to believe that members of an organization
are engaged in criminal activity.
The circuit's reliance on the "scrupulous exactitude" test of Stanford
should be viewed in light of a Supreme Court case 126 decided after Voss.
In New York v. P.J. Video, Inc. ,127 the Court held that "an application for a
warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by
the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of
119. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
120. United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1127-28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
862 (1984).
121. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
122. Truglio, 731 F.2d at 1127-28. See also United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005
(1984).
123. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S 367, 377 (1968).
124. See United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983) (items which are normally
protected by the first amendment can be the proper subject of a search when those items
will prove the taxpayer's association with criminal activity).
125. 701 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1983).




probable cause used to review warrant applications generally."' 128 Ac-
cordingly, the circuit's rejection of the argument that first amendment
considerations do not impose a higher standard on the government
should be reevaluated.
c. Request for Severance of Warrant
The circuit denied the government's request that the warrant be
severed and that the government be allowed to retain the items seized
under the provisions of the warrant which were sufficiently particular.
This ruling was based on the court's finding that the warrant's over-
breadth largely subsumed those provisions of the warrant which could
have been adequate standing alone.129 The court rejected the govern-
ment's reliance on the principles stated in United States v. Fitzgerald 130
and United States v. Apker 131 that absent a showing of bad faith, the inva-
lidity of part of a search warrant does not require the suppression of all
evidence seized during its execution.
d. Concurring Opinion
Although Judge Logan concurred with the majority decision, he did
not accept the majority's disapproval of the government's reliance on
United States v. Brien 132 and United States v. Offices Known as 50 State Distrib-
uting Company '33 to support an all-records search. His concurring opin-
ion was apparently premised on the fact that the government had
difficulty identifying the exact statute which the taxpayer had violated,
thus causing the warrant to be overbroad. Judge Logan concluded by
stating that "[t]he government has neither demonstrated that virtually
all of the NCBA's activities are illegal nor pinpointed the statutes that
the business allegedly has violated. The purpose of an 'all records'
search cannot be to find out what crime a person or entity might have
committed."134
4. Implications of Holding
The precedential weight of this holding within the circuit will make
it likely that search warrants issued in connection with future tax investi-
gations will be judged under the stricter standard outlined herein. This
holding could have an adverse effect on the government's capability to
investigate possible violations of federal tax laws in the future due to
such a strict particularity requirement to obtain a search warrant.
128. Id. at 1615.
129. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985).
130. 724 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984).
131. 705 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
132. 617 F.2d 299 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
133. 708 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984).
134. Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 409 (10th Cir. 1985) (Logan, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
During the survey period, consideration for taxpayers' interests was
apparent in a number of decisions rendered by the Tenth Circuit. In
Phillips and Wells, the court adopted a subjective standard for assessing a
taxpayer's "good faith misunderstanding of law" defense. In Church of
World Peace, the court relied on certain statutory and constitutional safe-
guards as authority to limit a tax investigation of a church. In Cyclone
Drilling, Inc., the court held the government to a high standard of care in
satisfying the notice requirements for a valid tax assessment. In Voss, the
government was likewise held to a high standard of care in satisfying the
particularity requirement for a valid search warrant in connection with a
criminal tax investigation.
If the holdings in these decisions were to be further extended, there
could be a detrimental effect on the government's capability to success-
fully investigate and prosecute future violations of the federal tax laws.
Such a result, although an apparently unintended consequence of the
circuit's holdings, is a possibility nonetheless. Accordingly, care should
be taken when applying these holdings as judicial precedent.
Vincent . Oliva
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